We give a semantics for a classical variant of Dale Miller and Alwen Tiu's logic F Oλ ∇ . No such semantics seems to have existed for the nabla operator, except for one given by U. Schöpp. Our semantics validates the rule that nabla x implies exists x, but is otherwise faithful to the authors' original intentions. The semantics is based on category of so-called nabla-sets, which we define as presheaves over the poset of natural numbers, with additional generic elements at each level. The semantics is sound, complete for Henkin structures, and complete for standard structures in the case of Π1 formulae.
Prolog(ue)
I started my research career in automated deduction, and came to learn about Dale when I touched the subject of proofs in higher-order logic. His work on expansion proofs was impressive, and daunting. I kept on hearing of Dale, as he developed λ-Prolog, as he discovered higherorder patterns, as he realized the value of uniform proofs, of intuitionism, of hereditary Harrop formulae, as he studied extensions of logic with definitions, as he delved into focusing and linear logic, and so on and so forth.
We finally got in touch on the 14th of February, 2002. I had sent him a rather vague question on his paper [5] by email that day. My interest was to encode fresh names ("nonces") in cryptographic protocols, and I had seen that Dale had pursued the idea of using the quantifiers of linear logic to this very end. The paper's title ended with the enigmatic phrase "preliminary results", and I wanted to know whether he had done any more recent research in this vein. He answered me the same day, despite the fact that he was busy at a Logic and Interaction meeting in Marseilles-Luminy, and that we had never met before. Dale has to be commended for giving me a lucid and candid answer. Who do you know would tell the following to a perfect stranger?
If you map processes to logical formulas directly, you have a lot of exciting things that can happen. My original efforts (an experiment, really) failed, however, for at least two reasons (referring to the paper "The pi-calculus as a theory in linear logic").
• a family of elements new D n+1 ∈ D n , n ∈ N, such that new
We shall write old n for old D n when no confusion may arise. We shall also write old 
Definition 3.2.
A nabla-map f from a nabla-set D to a nabla-set E is a family of maps f n : D n → E n , n ∈ N, such that old n • f n = f n+1 • old n .
We do not require that f n+1 (new Nabla-sets and nabla-maps form a category ∇ ∇ ∇. An isomorphism between D and E in ∇ ∇ ∇ is a collection of bijections f n : D n → E n such that old n • f n = f n+1 • old n . The bijections will usually fail to map new 
∇ ∇ ∇ is very close to a familiar presheaf category. Let N be the set of natural numbers, with the usual ordering. Any poset can be considered as a category, whose objects are the elements of the poset, and where there is one morphism from m to n if m ≤ n, no morphism otherwise. One can then form the category Set N of all functors from N to the category Set of sets, with natural transformations as morphisms. One can check that Set N is equivalently defined much like ∇ ∇ ∇: objects of Set N are given by a family of sets (D n ) n∈N (possibly empty), together with maps old D n : D n → D n+1 (not necessarily injective), n ∈ N, and morphisms f from D to E are families of maps f n :
Set N is Cartesian-closed and complete. Almost the same thing can be said for ∇ ∇ ∇, except for one important point: ∇ ∇ ∇ does not have a terminal object (i.e., a 0-ary product; I will leave that as an exercise to the reader).
Nonetheless, most of the structure of Set N is preserved. Notably, ∇ ∇ ∇ has products of all non-empty families (
n (d i )) i∈I , and we may define new
All other products are, as usual, obtained as isomorphic copies.
We shall use the following notations:
A Cartesian-closed category is one with all finite products (i.e., terminal objects and binary products), and where every object D is exponentiable. 
satisfying the following equations [1] :
Proposition 3.4. In ∇ ∇ ∇, every object is exponentiable.
Proof. Given two nabla-sets D and E, we define
We claim that [D → E] n is non-empty for every n ∈ N. Pick e ∈ E 0 , define f m as the constant map with value old E 0→m (e), and check that (f m ) m≥n is an element of [D → E] n . Next, the maps old
, there is at most one map f n such that old
must be a collection of maps (new
, which we define by induction on m. For m = n + 1, we let new [D→E] (n+1)(n+1) be the constant map with value new is not in the image of old
[D→E] n , for n ∈ N, as we now show. Otherwise, there would be an element
is an exponential object either follows from a tedious verification, or as a consequence of the corresponding statement that Set N is Cartesian-closed.
We leave it as an exercise to the reader to check that the β, η and substitution rules are satisfied.
Unlike most other presheaf categories, Set N satisfies the so-called external axiom of choice, and similarly for ∇ ∇ ∇: every epi splits. We prefer the following formulation, which is closer to what we think the axiom of choice should state, and also slightly more general.
Proposition 3.5 (Choice).
A nabla-subset (A n ) n∈N of a nabla-set (D n ) n∈N is a collection of subsets A n of D n , n ∈ N, such that for every n ∈ N, for every a ∈ A n , old Proof. We build f n by induction on n. The function f 0 is simply obtained by applying the set-theoretic axiom of choice to select an e ∈ E 0 such that (d, e) ∈ R 0 , for each d ∈ D 0 , and defining f 0 (d) as e.
At level n + 1, we make cases depending on whether d is in the image of old
That implies the following, which will be our bane in Section 7.
Corollary 3.6 (Weak Choice). Let D, E be two nabla-sets. Fix n ∈ N, and let
and e is arbitrary. Then (R k ) k∈N is a nabla-subset of D ×E , and one satisfying the assumptions of Proposition 3.5. Hence there is a nabla-map
The claim follows by looking at the case k = 0, and by letting f m = f m−n for every m ≥ n.
Seemingly related is the following result, which will however be a boon to us: it will be used to show that our semantics of ∇ is sound. This is exactly the place where we need new D n+1 to be fresh, that is, outside Im old D n (Definition 3.1, third item). Lemma 3.7. Let D, E be two nabla-sets, n ∈ N, and e ∈ E n+1 . There is a nabla-map
. This is a collection of maps (g m ) m≥0 such that old
for every m ≥ 0. In other words, it is a nabla-map from D to E. We build a nabla-map f = (f m ) m∈N from D to E by patching g.
For every m ≤ n, we let f m = g m . For m = n + 1, we let f n+1 map new D n+1 to e, and every element d = new 
Standard and Henkin Semantics for λ-Terms
Let use consider simply-typed λ-terms M in Church style, that is, all variables have a preassigned type. We agree that given a variable x τ , its type is τ . There are countably infinitely many variables of each type τ . We shall sometimes omit the subscript τ when it is clear. There are base types including the type ι of individuals, and other types are formed using the arrow type former →. Later, and for the purposes of completeness, we shall require that there be exactly one type ι of individuals.
Proposition 3.4 allows us to define a standard semantics for λ-terms: we fix nabla-sets S τ for every base type, define S ϕ → τ as the exponential object [S ϕ → S τ ] or one of its variants, inductively; finally, we define the value of applications through App and the value of λ-abstractions through Λ.
There is a more general construction, which we call a Henkin semantics for nabla, and which we shall need to establish completeness. This is simply a listing of our basic requirements. Definition 4.1 (Henkin Universe). A Henkin universe S for nabla is the following data:
• for each type τ , a nabla-set S τ ;
We write Env for the product xτ S τ , where x τ ranges over all variables: Env n is the set of environments ρ at level n, namely functions mapping each variable x τ to an element ρ(x τ ) ∈ S τ n ;
• for each type τ , a set S(τ ) of nabla-maps from Env to τ , containing all the projections π xτ -where (π xτ ) n (ρ) = ρ(x τ ) for every environment ρ at level n;
• for each pair of types ϕ, τ , a nabla-map App : S ϕ → τ × S ϕ → S τ , with the property that for every f ∈ S(ϕ → τ ) and for every g ∈ S(ϕ), App • f, g is in S(τ );
• for every variable x ϕ and each type τ , a function
such that, defining:
1. for all βη-convertible λ-terms M, N : τ , S M = S N ;
2. for every λ-term M : τ , for every n ∈ N, S M n ρ does not depend on ρ(y) if y is not free in M , namely: if ρ(z) = ρ (z) for every z = y, then S M n ρ = S M n ρ ;
3. for all λ-terms N : τ and M : ϕ, for every n ∈ N, for every environment ρ at level n,
Adapting Lemma 3.7 in view of our upcoming proof of soundness, we also define:
Definition 4.2 (Enough Maps). A Henkin universe S for nabla has enough maps if and only if, for all types ϕ and τ , for every n ∈ N, for every d ∈ S τ n+1 , there is an f ∈ S ϕ → τ n such that App n+1 (old n (f ), new
The Standard Universe
Lemma 4.3 (The Standard Universe). Given nabla-sets D τ , one for each base type τ , there is a Henkin universe S such that:
• S(τ ) is the set of all nabla-maps from Env to τ , for each type τ ;
• App is the application morphism in ∇ ∇ ∇;
• for every f : Env → S τ , Λ xϕ (f ) = Λ(f • bind xϕ ), where Λ is currification in ∇ ∇ ∇ and
, the environment that maps x ϕ to d and every variable y = x to ρ(y).
This Henkin universe S has enough maps. We call S a standard universe on the nabla-sets D τ .
Proof. 1. The fact that for all βη-convertible λ-terms M, N : τ , S M = S N , owes to the properties of exponentiable objects (see Proposition 3.4), and is immediate. 2. If ρ(z) = ρ (z) for every z = y, then S M n ρ = S M n ρ : this is an easy structural induction on M .
3. We show that for all λ-terms N : τ and M : ϕ, for every n ∈ N, for every environment
We first notice that: (a) for every m ≥ n, old
. This is merely the expression that S M is a nabla-map, by definition.
We now show that
, by structural induction on N . The only interesting case is when N is a λ-abstraction λy ϕ .P . Then, assuming that y ϕ = x τ and that y ϕ is not free in M , by α-renaming:
(by induction hypothesis)
(by 2.)
(by (a))
(by definition of old Env )
We now claim that S has enough maps. Fix d ∈ S τ n+1 . By Lemma 3.7, there is a nabla-map (f m ) m∈N : S ϕ → S τ such that f n+1 (new
Remark 4.4. A standard universe S is uniquely determined by choosing nabla-sets S τ for each base type τ , and by choosing generic elements new S ϕ→τ n , n ∈ N, for each arrow type ϕ → τ .
The Term Universe
We now exhibit another Henkin universe T , built from syntax. This will be useful to show completeness. Here we require that there be exactly one base type ι.
The universe T is built from an extension of the λ-calculus we have considered until now, obtained by adding a countably infinite supply of new constants a i , i ≥ 1, all of type ι, and called names. We assume that those names are pairwise distinct; a i is the name at level i.
We build nominal (simply-typed) λ-terms inductively by: every variable x τ is a nominal λ-term, of type τ ; every name a i is a nominal λ-term, of type ι; if M is a nominal λ-term of type ϕ → τ and N is a nominal λ-term of type ϕ, then M N is a nominal λ-term of type τ ; if M is a nominal λ-term of type τ , and x ϕ is a variable, then λx ϕ .M is a nominal λ-term of type ϕ → τ .
In other words, nominal λ-terms are ordinary λ-terms on an enlarged set of variables, consisting of variables and names, and restricted so that names cannot occur bound. We will not take this view, and we will enforce a strict separation between variables and names.
We consider nominal λ-terms modulo βη-conversion, and by this we mean a nominal λ-term is shorthand for its βη-normal form. This convention allows us to make sense of the notions of free variables, and of free names, of a nominal λ-term. Definition 4.5. For each type τ , for every n ∈ N, T τ n is the set of all nominal λ-terms of type τ (up to βη-conversion) in which the only free names are of the form a i with 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
The maps old T τ n map M to M , and, writing τ in a unique way as τ 1 → τ 2 → · · · → τ m → ι, new T τ n = λx 1 τ1 .λx 2 τ2 . · · · .λx m τm .a n , where x 1 τ1 , x 2 τ2 , . . . x m τm are distinct fresh variables.
Remark 4.6. For every type τ , T τ 0 is just the set of ordinary, not nominal, λ-terms of type τ , modulo βη-conversion.
For any set of variables A, a substitution θ at level n of domain A is any function that maps every variable z ψ to an element of T ψ n . When A is finite, we define the capture-avoiding application M θ of θ to the λ-term M in the usual way.
If θ and θ agree on the set of free variables of M , then M θ = M θ . We can therefore extend the notation M θ to substitutions θ of arbitrary domains, by defining M θ as M θ |A , where A is any finite subset containing the free variables of M .
Define again Env as xτ T τ . An element θ of Env n is a substitution at level n, so that every λ-term M defines a map M n : Env n → T τ n , which sends θ to M θ. Then M = ( M n ) n∈N is a nabla-map from Env to T τ . 
The following fact is immediate. Let N ∈ T τ n+1 . We wish to find an M ∈ T ϕ → τ n such that M new
Write ϕ is a unique way as ϕ 1 → ϕ 2 → · · · → ϕ m → ι, and pick some arbitrary λ-terms M 1 : ϕ 1 , M 2 : ϕ 2 , . . . , M n : ϕ n -variables, for example. Build a new term N by replacing all occurrences of a n+1 in N by the term x ϕ M 1 M 2 · · · M m , where x ϕ is a fresh variable of type ϕ. Finally, define M as λx ϕ . N . The only names a i that occur free in M are such that 1 ≤ i ≤ n, by construction, so M is in T ϕ → τ n , and M new The logic F Oλ ∇ was introduced by Miller and Tiu [6] , as an intuitionistic first-order logic with predicates on higher-order terms, together with the ∇ operator. Schöpp [8] used a classical variant of that logic. We use a close cousin of the latter: the only differences are that ∇x τ .F will imply ∃x τ .F in our logic, and that ∇x τ .F and ∇y ϕ .F will be equivalent if x τ and y ϕ are not free in F .
Instead of considering all the connectives, we shall restrict ourselves to ⊥ (false), ⊃ (implication) and ∀ (universal quantification). The other connectives could be dealt with similarly. We profit from the fact that our logic is classical, so that those other connectives are definable:
We are given a countable set of so-called relation symbols P , each coming with an arity, which is a finite list of types τ 1 , τ 2 , · · · , τ k . Atomic formulae are of the form
. . , M k : τ k are λ-terms and P is a relation symbol of arity τ 1 , τ 2 , · · · , τ k . The formulae are built from atomic formulae and ⊥ using ⊃, ∀, and the nabla quantifier ∇: if F is a formula, then ∇x τ .F is a formula.
Call a signature any finite list σ of pairwise distinct variables x 1 τ1 , x 2 τ2 , · · · , x m τm . To stick with conventional writing, we shall write that signature
A generic judgment (or, more simply, a judgment) J is an expression of the form σ F where σ is a signature (the local signature of the judgment) and F is a formula. The meaning of x 1 : τ 1 , x 2 : τ 2 , · · · , x m : τ m F is intended to be the same as ∇x 1 τ1 .∇x 2 τ2 . · · · .∇x m τm .F . We write λσ.F for λx 1 : τ 1 , x 2 : τ 2 , · · · , x m : τ m F . We also write σ, σ for the concatenation of signatures when this makes sense.
Definition 5.1. Let ≈ be the smallest equivalence relation on judgments such that:
• if λσ.F and λσ .F are βη-convertible, then (σ F ) ≈ (σ F );
• if x τ and y ϕ are not free in F , then (σ, x : τ, σ F ) ≈ (σ, y : ϕ, σ F ).
A sequent of F Oλ ∇ is an expression Γ −→ ∆, where Γ, ∆ are finite multisets of judgments.
Remark 5.2. Those are slightly different from the sequents of [6] , which are of the form Σ; Γ −→ ∆, where Σ is a (global) signature. This makes a difference in our way of formulating the (∀L) rule, which allows us to instantiate x τ by any term of type τ whatsoever, including non-ground terms, hence to prove the implication ∀x τ .F ⊃ ∇x τ .F , and therefore also (since ∇ commutes with negation), ∇x τ .F ⊃ ∃x τ .F .
We write Γ, J for the addition of the judgment J to Γ, and Γ, Θ for the union of the multisets Γ and Θ. We write M : τ to state that M is a term of type τ , as in the first premise of (∀L).
The rules of F Oλ ∇ are shown in Figure 5 . In the rightmost premise of (∀L), one can find
but M is allowed to capture variables from σ, on purpose. In (∀R), h : σ → τ abbreviates h : τ 1 → τ 2 → · · · → τ n → τ , and hσ abbreviates hx 1 x 2 · · · x n .
We define a semantics of all the objects considered above, as follows.
Definition 5.3. Given a nabla-set D, let a nabla-predicate P on D be a family (P n ) n∈N of subsets P n of D n .
Nabla-predicates are not nabla-relations, as defined in Proposition 3.5: we do not require that for every n ∈ N and for every d ∈ P n , old
Definition 5.4. A Henkin structure is a Henkin universe S, together with nabla-predicates S P on S τ 1 × S τ 2 × · · · × S τ k for each relation symbol P of arity τ 1 , τ 2 , · · · , τ k .
A standard structure is a Henkin structure whose underlying Henkin universe is a standard universe S (see Lemma 4.3).
We now define satisfaction of a formula F at level n as follows, in a Henkin structure S, where ρ is a Σ-environment at level n.
This extends to judgments by letting S; ρ |= n x 1 : τ 1 , x 2 : τ 2 , · · · , x m : τ m F if and only if S; ρ |= n ∇x 1 τ1 .∇x 2 τ2 . · · · .∇x m τm .F ; then, to sequents by letting S; ρ |= n Γ −→ ∆ if and only if S; ρ |= n J for some J in Γ or S; ρ |= n J for some J in ∆.
Lemma 5.5. For every λ-term M of type τ , for every n ∈ N,
Proof. 1. It is enough to prove the claim when J is a formula, by structural induction on it, paying attention to α-renaming in the case of universal quantification and ∇ quantification. We describe the latter case, when J = ∇y ϕ .F . By α-renaming, y ϕ is different from x τ and not free in M . Write ρ for old
2. Immediate consequence of 1.
We say that two formulae F and G are equivalent if and only if, for every nabla-structure S, for every n ∈ N, for every environment ρ at level n, S; ρ |= n F if and only if S; ρ |= n G.
Lemma 5.6. The following are pairs of equivalent formulae:
2. ∇x τ .F and ∇y ϕ .F , if neither x τ nor y ϕ is free in F ; 3. ∇x τ .∀y ϕ .F and ∀h τ →ϕ .∇x τ .F [hx/y].
Proof. The first equivalence is a simple verification. The second one follows from the fact that the semantics of a formula F in an environment ρ does not depend on the values ρ(z ψ ) such that z ψ is not free in F . This an easy induction on F , which uses property 2 of Henkin structures in the base case.
Finally, for the third equivalence, we have:
while S; ρ |= n ∀h τ →ϕ .∇x τ .F [hx/y] if and only if:
S; old
where we have used Lemma 5.5, item 2, and the fact that h is not free in F in the last line. The two are equivalent: in one direction, for every f ∈ S τ → ϕ n , App n+1 (old n (f ), new n+1 ) is a value d in S ϕ n+1 , so (1) implies (2). In the converse direction, for every d ∈ S ϕ n+1 , we can find an f ∈ S τ → ϕ n such that App n+1 (old n (f ), new S ϕ n+1 ) = d, because S has enough maps. Hence (2) implies (1).
We write S |= n Γ −→ ∆ if and only if S; ρ |= n Γ −→ ∆ for every Σ-environment ρ at level n, and we say that Γ −→ ∆ is valid if and only if this holds for every n ∈ N and for every Henkin structure S with enough maps. Proof. It suffices to show that S; ρ |= n Γ −→ ∆ by induction on the given derivation.
In the case of the (⊃ L)/(⊃ R) rules, we must show that S; ρ |= n σ (F ⊃ G) if and only if S; ρ |= n σ F or S; ρ |= n σ G: this is an easy induction on the number of variables in σ, using Lemma 5.6, item 1.
In the case of (≈ L)/(≈ R), we must show that S; ρ |= n J if and only if S; ρ |= n J , assuming J ≈ J . It suffices to show that this is the case when J and J are βη-convertible (which follows from property 1 of Henkin universes), and when J = σ, x : τ, σ F , J = σ, y : ϕ, σ F , with x τ , y ϕ not free in F (that follows from Lemma 5.6, item 2).
In the case of (∀R), assume that S; ρ |= n Γ −→ ∆, (σ F [hσ/x τ ]), with h fresh of type σ → τ . Equivalently, S; ρ |= n Γ −→ ∆, ( ∇σ.F [hσ/x τ ]), where we write ∇σ for ∇x 1 τ1 .∇x 2 τ2 . · · · .∇x m τm , assuming σ = x 1 : τ 1 , x 2 : τ 2 , · · · , x m : τ m . Trivially, this implies S; ρ |= n Γ −→ ∆, ( ∀h σ→τ .∇σ.F [hσ/x τ ]), since h is fresh. By iterating Lemma 5.6, item 3, m times, we obtain S; ρ |= n Γ −→ ∆, ( ∇σ.∀x τ .F ), that is, S; ρ |= n Γ −→ ∆, (σ ∀x τ .F ).
In the case of (∀L), let M be a λ-term of type τ , and assume S; ρ n |= n Γ, (σ F [M/x τ ]) −→ ∆. Assume also that S; ρ |= n J for every J in Γ, and S; ρ |= n (σ ∀x τ .F ). We aim to show that S; ρ |= n J for some J in ∆. By Lemma 5.6, item 3 again, the latter implies S; ρ |= n ∀h σ→τ .∇σ.F [hσ/x τ ]. Instantiate h σ→τ by λσ.M . It follows that S; ρ |= n ∇σ.F [M/x τ ], hence S; ρ |= n σ F [M/x τ ]. Since S; ρ |= n J for every J in Γ and S; ρ n |= n Γ, (σ F [M/x τ ]) −→ ∆, we conclude.
The other cases are immediate.
Henkin Completeness
We shall show that the deduction system of Figure 5 is complete using a variant of the technique of Hintikka sets, a technique used to show that tableaux calculi are complete for first-order logic. This will also show that the (Cut) rule is not needed for completeness. Our purpose now is, given an unprovable sequent, to find a model of it. A signed judgment is an expression of the form +J or −J, where J is a judgment. On the semantic side, we understand +J as meaning "J is true", and −J as "J is false". On the syntactic side, we see a sequent J 1 , · · · , J m → J 1 , · · · , J n as a collection of signed judgments +J 1 , · · · , +J m , −J 1 , · · · , −J n . We extend ≈ to signed judgments in the obvious way. Definition 6.1. A theory T is a set of signed judgments.
T is inconsistent if and only if there are finitely many signed judgments +J 1 , . . . , +J m , −J 1 , . . . , −J n in T such that the sequent J 1 , · · · , J m → J 1 , · · · , J n is derivable in the system of Figure 5 , using all rules except the cut rule (Cut). T is consistent otherwise.
T is a Hintikka theory if and only if:
